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Abstract 
We present a mathematical framework (referred to as Context-driven Actualization of Potential, or 
CAP)  for describing how entities change over time under the influence of a context.  The approach 
facilitates comparison of change of state of entities studied in different disciplines. Processes are seen 
to differ according to the degree of nondeterminism, and the degree to which they are sensitive to, 
internalize, and depend upon a particular context. Our analysis suggests that the dynamical evolution of 
a quantum entity described by the Schrödinger equation is not fundamentally different from change 
provoked by a measurement often referred to as collapse but a limiting case, with only one way to 
collapse. The biological transition to coded replication is seen as a means of preserving structure in the 
face of context, and sexual replication as a means of increasing potentiality thus enhancing diversity 
through interaction with context. The framework sheds light on concepts like selection and fitness, 
reveals how exceptional Darwinian evolution is as a means of ‘change of state’, and clarifies in what 
sense culture (and the creative process underlying it) are Darwinian. 
 
Keywords 
Change of state, collapse, context, dynamical evolution, evolution, natural selection, nondeterminism, 
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1. Introduction 
This paper elaborates a general theory of change of state (a nascent, nonmathematical draft of which is 
presented elsewhere1) with the goal of uniting physical, biological, and cultural evolution, not 
reductively, but through a process that may be referred to as inter-level theorizing (see2). Other unifying 
theories have been put forward, such as that of Treur3 which takes temporal factorization as its unifying 
principle. Our scheme focuses on the role of context; i.e. on the fact that what entities of different kinds 
have in common is that they change through a reiterated process of interaction with a context. We refer 
to this fundamental process of change of state under the influence of a context as context-driven 
actualization of potential, or CAP. By “potential” we do not mean determined or preordained; indeed, 
different forms of evolution differ according to the degree of nondeterminism, as well as degree of 
contextuality and retention of context-driven change. We conclude with several examples of how the 
scheme has already born fruit: it suggests a unifying scheme for the two kinds of change in quantum 
mechanics, 4 illustrates why the earliest forms of life could not have evolved through natural selection,5 
and helps clarify how the concept of evolution applies to culture6,7 and creative thought8,9. 
 
2. Deterministic and Nondeterministic Evolution under the Influence of a Context 
In this section we discuss the kinds of change that must be incoroporated in a general scheme for the 
description of the evolution of an entity under the influence of a changing or unchanging context. We 
use the term evolution to mean simply ‘change of state’. Thus our neither implies natural selection nor 
change in the absence of a measurement; the term is thus used as it was prior to both Darwin and 
Schrödinger.  
Since we do not always have perfect knowledge of the state of the entity, the context, and the 
interaction between them, a general description of an evolutionary process must be able to cope with 
nondeterminism. Processes differ with respect to the degree of determinism involved in the changes of 
state that the entity undergoes. Consider an entity—whether it be physical, biological, mental, or some 
other sort—in a state p(t
i
)  at an instant of time t
i
. If it is under the influence of a context e(t
i
) , and we 
know with certainty that p(t
i
) changes to state p(t
i+1)  at time ti+1 , we refer to the change of state as 
deterministic. Newtonian physics provides the classic example of deterministic change of state. 
Knowing the speed and position of a material object, one can predict its speed and position at any time 
in the future. In many situations, however, an entity in a state p(t
i
)  at time t
i
under the influence of a 
context e(t
i
)may change to any state in the set p
1
(t
i+1), p2 (ti+1),..., pn (ti+1),...{ } . When more than one 
change of state is possible, the process is nondeterministic.  
Nondeterministic change can be divided into two kinds. In the first, the nondeterminism 
originates from a lack of knowledge concerning the state of the entity p(t
i
) itself. This means that deep 
down the change is deterministic, but since we lack knowledge about what happens at this deeper level, 
and since we want to make a model of what we know, the model we make is nondeterministic. This 
kind of nondeterminism is modeled by a stochastic theory that makes use of a probability structure that 
satisfies Kolmogorov’s axioms.  
 Another possibility is that the nondeterminism arises through lack of knowledge concerning the 
context e(t
i
) , or how that context interacts with the entity. Yet another possibility is that the 
nondeterminism is ontological i.e. the universe is at bottom intrinsically nondeterministic. It has been 
proven that in these cases, the stochastic model to describe this situation necessitates a non-
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Kolmogorovian probability model. A Kolmogorovian probability model (such as is used in population 
genetics) cannot be used.10,11,12,13,14,15 It is only possible to ignore the problem of incomplete knowledge 
of context if all contexts are equally likely, or if context has a temporary or limited effect. Because the 
entity has the potential to change to many different states (given the various possible states the context 
could be in, since we lack precise knowledge of it), we say that it is in a potentiality state with respect 
to context. This is schematically depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Graphical representation of a general evolution process. Contexts e(t
0
) , e(t
1
) , e(t
2
)  and e(t
3
)at 
times t
0
,t
1
,t
2
, and t
3
, are represented by vertical lines. States of the entity are represented by circles on 
vertical lines. At time t
0
the entity is in state p(t
0
) . Under the influence of context e(t
0
) , its state can change to 
one of the states in the set p
1
(t
2
), p
2
(t
2
), p
3
(t
2
),..., p
n
(t
2
),...{ } . These potential changes are represented by 
thin lines. Only one change actually takes place, the one represented by a thick line, i.e. p(t
0
) changes to 
p
4
(t
1
) . At time t
1
the entity in state p
4
(t
1
)  is under the influence of another context e(t
1
) , and can change to 
one of p
1
(t
2
), p
2
(t
2
), p
3
(t
2
),..., p
n
(t
2
),...{ } .  Again only one change occurs, i.e. p4 (t1)  changes to p3(t2 ) . 
The process then starts all over again. Under the influence of a new context e(t
2
) , the entity can change to one 
of  p
1
(t
3
), p
2
(t
3
), p
3
(t
3
), p
4
(t
3
),..., p
n
(t
3
),...{ } . Again only one change happens: p3(t2 )  changes to p5 (t3) . 
The dashed lines from states that have not been actualized at a certain instant indicate that much more 
potentiality is present at time t
0
than explicitly shown. For example, if p(t
0
)  had changed to p
2
(t
1
)  instead of 
p
4
(t
2
)  , which was possible at time t
0
, then context e(t
1
)  would have exerted a different effect on the entity at 
time t
1
, such that a new vertical line at time t
1
 would have to be drawn, representing another pattern of change.
 
 
We stress that a potentiality state is not predetermined, just waiting for its time to come along, at 
least not insofar as our models can discern, possibly because we cannot precisely specify the context 
that will come along and actualize it. Note also that a state is only a potentiality state in relation to a 
certain (incompletely specified) context. It is possible for a state to be a potentiality state with respect 
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to one context, and a deterministic state with respect to another. More precisely, a state that is 
deterministic with respect to a context can be considered a limit case of a potentiality state, with zero 
potentiality. 
In reality the universe is so complex we can never describe with complete certainty and accuracy 
the context to which an entity is exposed, and how it interacts with the entity. There is always some 
possibility of even very unlikely outcomes. However, there are situations in which we can predict the 
values of relevant variables with sufficient accuracy that we may consider the entity to be in a 
particular state, and other situations in which there is enough uncertainty to necessitate the concept of 
potentiality. Thus a formalism for describing the evolution of these entities must take into account the 
degree of knowledge we as observers have about the context. 
 
3.  SCOP: A Mathematics that Incorporates Nondeterministic Change 
We have seen that a description of the evolutionary trajectory of an entity may involve nondeterminism 
with respect to the state of the entity, the context, or how they interact. An important step toward the 
development of a general framework for how entities evolve is to find a mathematical structure that can 
incorporate all these possibilities. There exists an elaborate mathematical framework for describing the 
change and actualization of potentiality through contextual interaction that was developed for quantum 
mechanics. However it has several limitations, including the linearity of the Hilbert space, and the fact 
that one can only describe the extreme case where change of state is maximally contextual. Other 
mathematical theories, such as State COntext Property (SCOP) systems, lift the quantum formalism out 
of its specific structural limitations, making it possible to describe nondeterministic effects of context 
in other domains. 16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29 The original motivation for these generalized 
formalisms was theoretical (as opposed to the need to describe the reality revealed by experiments). In 
the SCOP formalism, for instance, an entity is described by three sets ! ,  M and  L and two functions 
µ and ! . !  represents that set of states of the entity,  M the set of contexts, and  L the set of properties 
of the entity.  
The function µ  is a probability function that describes how state p !"  under the influence of 
context  e!M changes to state q !" . Mathematically, this means that µ  is a function defined as 
follows 
 
 
µ :! "M " !# 0,1[ ]
(q,e, p)a µ(q,e, p)
 (1.1) 
where µ(q,e, p) is the probability that the entity in state p  changes to state q under the influence of 
context e .  Hence µ describes the structure of the contextual interaction of the entity under study.  
 
3.1.  Sensitivity to Context 
A parameter that differentiates evolving entities is the degree of sensitivity to context, or more 
precisely, the degree to which a change of state of context evokes a change of state of the entity. 
Degree of sensitivity to context depends on both the state of the entity and the state of the 
context. The degree of sensitivity to context is expressed by the probability of collapse. If the 
probability is close to 1, it means that this context almost with certainty (deterministically) 
causes the state of the entity to change to the collapsed state. If the probability is close to zero, it 
means that this context is unlikely to causes the state of the entity to change to the collapsed 
state. Specifically, ifµ(q,e, p) = 0 , then e has no influence on the entity in state p , and 
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if µ(q,e, p) = 1 , then e has a strong, deterministic influence on the entity in state p . A value 
of µ(q,e, p)  between 0 and 1, which is the general situation, quantifies the influence of context 
e on the entity in state p . 
 
3.2.  Degree of Nondeterminism 
Suppose we consider the set  
 µ(q,e, p) | e!M{ }" [0,1]  (1.2) 
which is a set of points between 0 and 1. Suppose this set equals the singleton 1{ } . This would mean 
that for all contexte!M the entity in state p changed to the entity in stateq . Hence this would indicate 
a situation of ‘deterministic change independent of context’ for the entity, between state p and state q . 
On the contrary, if this set equals the singleton 0{ } , this would mean that the entity in state p  never 
changes to state q , again independent of context. The general situation of the set being a subset of the 
interval [0,1] hence models in a detailed way the overal contextual way two states p and q are 
dynamically connected. 
 
3.3. Weights of Properties 
We need a means of expressing that certain properties are more applicable to some entities than others, 
or more applicable to entities when they are in one state than when they are in another state. The 
function ! describes the weight (which is the renormalization of the applicability) of a certain property 
given a specific state. This means that!  is a function from the set  ! " L to the interval 0,1[ ] , where 
!(p,a)  is the weight of propertya for the entity in state p . We write 
 
 
! :" # L $ 0,1[ ]
(p,a)a !(p,a)
 (1.3) 
The function ! , contrary to µ , describes the internal structure of the entity under investigation. 
Again we can look to some special situations to clarify how ! models the internal structure. Suppose 
that we have !(a, p) = 1 . This means that for the entity in state p the property a has weight equal to 1, 
which means that it is actual with certainty (probability equal to 1). Hence, this represents a situation 
where the entity, in state p , ‘has’ the property ‘in acto’. On the contrary, if !(a, p) = 0 , it means that 
for the entity in state p is not at all actual, but completely potential. A value of !(a, p)between 0 and 1 
describes in a refined way ‘how property a is’ when the entity is in state p . Hence the set 
 !(a, p) | a "L{ }# [0,1]  (1.4) 
gives a good description of the internal structure of the entity, i.e. how properties are depending on the 
different states the entity can be in. 
 
4. Expressing Dynamics: Context-driven Actualization of Potential (CAP) 
Context-driven Actualization of Potential, or CAP, is the dynamics of entities modeled by SCOP. This 
which means that the mathematical model for CAP will be as follows: at moment t
i
we have a SCOP 
 (!,M ,L,µ,")(t
i
) = (!(t
i
),M (t
i
),L,µ,")  (1.5) 
where !(t
i
) is the set of states of the entity at time t
i
and M (t
i
) is the set of relevant contexts at time t
i
. 
L is independent of time, since it is the collection of properties of the entity under consideration. 
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Properties themselves do not change over time, but their status of ‘actual’ or ‘potential’ can change 
with the change of the state of the entity. One should in fact look to it the other way around: a property 
is an element of the entity idependent of time, or, it is exactly the elements independent of time that 
give rise to properties. That is also the reason that L and ! describe the internal context independent 
structure of the entity under consideration. 
In Figure 1 a typical dynamical pattern of CAP is presented. Four consecutive moments of time 
t
0
,t
1
,t
2
and t
3
are considered. It can be seen in the figure how, for example context e(t
0
)has an 
influence on the entity in state p(t
0
)which is such that the entity can change into one of the states of the 
set p
1
(t
1
), p
2
(t
1
), p
3
(t
1
),..., p
n
(t
1
){ } . This is an example of a general nondeterministic type of change. 
Similar types of changes are represented in the figure, under influence of contexts e(t
1
) , e(t
2
)and 
e(t
3
) . What is important to remark is that the actual change taking place is a path through the graph of 
the figure, but the states not touched by this path remain of influence for the overall pattern of change, 
since they are potentiality states. 
The states p0 (t0 ), pi1 (t1), pi2 (t2 ),..., pin (tn ),...  constitute the trajectory of the entity through state 
space, and describe its evolution in time. Thus, the general evolution process is broadly construed as 
the incremental change that results from recursive, context-driven actualization of potential, or CAP. A 
model of an evolutionary process may consist of both deterministic segments, where the entity changes 
state in a way that follows predictably given its previous state and/or the context to which it is exposed, 
and/or nondeterministic segments, where this is not the case. With a generalized quantum formalism 
such as SCOP it is possible to describe situations with any degree of contextuality. In fact, classical and 
quantum come out as special cases: quantum at one extreme of complete contextuality, and classical at 
the other extreme, complete lack of contextuality. 30,31,32 This is why it lends itself to the description of 
context-driven evolution. 
 
4.1. Degree to which Context-driven Change is Retained 
We saw that ifµ(q,e, p) = 1 , thene has a strong, deterministic influence on the entity in state p . 
However, an entity may be sensitive—readily undergo change of state due to context—but through 
regulatory mechanisms or self-replication have a tendency to return to a previous state. Thus although 
it is susceptible to undergoing a change of state from p to q, its internal dymaics are such that it goes 
back to state p. A simple example of a situation where this is not the case, i.e. context-driven change is 
retained is a rock breaking in two. An example where it is the case, i.e. context-driven change is not 
retained is the healing of an injury or the birth of offspring with none of the characteristics their parents 
acquired over their lifetimes. In the case of biological organisms, we are considering two interrelated 
entities, one embedded in the other: the organism itself, and its lineage.  
 
4.2. Context Independence 
The extent to which a change of context threatens the survival of the entity can be referred to as context 
dependence. The degree to which an entity is able to withstand, not just its particular environment, but 
any environment, can be referred to as context independence. Sensitivity to and retention of context can 
lead, in the long run, to either context dependence or context independence. This can depend on the 
variability of the contexts to which an entity is exposed. A static, impoverished environment may 
provide contexts that foster specializations tailored to that particular environment, whereas a dynamic, 
rich, diverse environment may foster general coping mechanisms. Thus for example, a species that 
develops an intestine specialized for the absorption of nutrients from a certain plant that is abundant in 
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its environment exhibits context dependence, whereas a species that becomes increasingly more able to 
consume any sort of vegetation exhibits context independence.  
Whether an entity exhibits context dependence or independence may simply reflect what one 
chooses to define as the entity of interest. If an entity splits into multiple ‘versions’ of itself (as through 
reproduction) each of which adapts to a different context and thus becomes more context dependent, 
when all versions are considered different lineages of one joint entity, that joint entity is becoming 
more context-independent. Thus for example, while different mammalian species are becoming more 
context dependent, the kindom as a whole is becoming more context independent. 
5. Ways the Universe has Found of Actualizing Potential 
We now look at how different kinds of evolution fit into the above framework, and how their 
trajectories differ with respect to the parameters introduced in the previous section. They are all means 
of actualizing potential that existed due to the state of the entity, the context, and the nature of their 
interaction, but differ widely with respect to these parameters. 
 
5.1. The Evolution of Physical Objects and Particles 
We begin by examining three kinds of change undergone by physical entities. The first is the collapse 
of quantum particles under the influence of a measurement. The second is the evolution of quantum 
particles when they are not measured. The third is the change of state of macroscopic physical objects. 
 
Nondeterministic Collapse of a Quantum Particle 
Let us begin with change of state in the most micro of all domains, quantum mechanics. The central 
mathematical object in quantum mechanics is a complex Hilbert space H , which is a vector space over 
the field C of complex numbers. Vectors p(t
i
) of this Hilbert space of unit length represent states 
p(t
i
)of a quantum particle. This is expressed in Hilbert space by the bra-ket of the vector with itself 
being equal to 1, hence 
 p(t
i
) p(t
i
) = 1  (1.6) 
A measurement e(t
i
) on a quantum particle is described by a self-adjoint operator E(t
i
) , which is a 
linear function on the Hilbert space, hence 
 E(t
i
) :H ! H  (1.7) 
such that 
 E(ti )(a p1(ti ) + b p2 (ti ) ) = aE(ti ) p1(ti ) + bE(ti ) p2 (ti )  (1.8) 
A self-adjoint operator always has a set of special states associated with it, the eigenstates. A state 
p(t
i
)described in the Hilbert space H by means of the vector p(t
i
) is an eigenstate of the 
measurement e(t
i
) represented by the self-adjoint operator E(t
i
) if and only if we have 
 E(t
i
) p(t
i
) = a p(t
i
)  (1.9) 
where a ∈ C is a real number, and a is called the eigenvalue of the measurement e(t
i
) the quantum 
particle being in state p(t
i
) . Let us denote the set of eigenstates corresponding to the measurement 
e(t
i
) by p
1
(t
i
), p
2
(t
i
),..., p
n
(t
i
),...{ } , and the set of their corresponding eigenvalues by a1,a2 ,...,an ,...{ } . 
Let us mention for mathematical completeness, that only when the self-adjoint operator has a point 
spectrum do we encounter the above situation in quantum mechanics. Measurements described by 
operators with a continuous  spectrum must be treated in a more sophisticated way. However, this is of 
no relevance to the points made here.  
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An eigenstate pj (ti )does not change under the influence of the measurement 
e(t
i
) described by the self-adjoint operator E(t
i
) , and the corresponding eigenvalue aj is the value 
obtained deterministically by the measurement. However the set of eigenstates corresponding to a 
measurement e(t
i
) is only a subset of the total set of states of the quantum particle. States that are not 
eigenstates of the measurement e(t
i
) are called superposition states with respect to the measurement 
e(t
i
) . Suppose that q(ti ) is such a superposition state of the quantum particle. The vector q(ti ) of the 
Hilbert space representing this superposition state can then always be written as a linear combination, 
i.e. a superposition, of the vectors p1(ti ) , p2 (ti ) ,..., pn (ti ) ,...{ } representing the eigenstates of the 
quantum particle. More specifically 
 q(ti ) = ! j p j (ti )
j
"  (1.10) 
where λj ∈ C are complex numbers such that 
 !
j
j
"
2
= 1  (1.11) 
The physical meaning of the coefficients ! j is the following: ! j
2
is the probability that the 
measurement e(t
i
)will yield the value aj and as a consequence of performing the measurement e(ti ) , 
the superposition state q(ti )  will change (collapse) to the eigenstate pj (ti ) with probability equal to 
!
j
2
. This change of state from a superposition state to an eigenstate is referred to as collapse. In 
general (depending on how many ! j
2
are non-zero), many eigenstates are possible states to collapse to 
under the influence of this measurement. In other words, the collapse is non-deterministic. This means 
that a genuine superposition state is a state of potentiality with respect to the measurement. This 
suggests that what we refer to as a context is the same thing as what in the standard quantum case is 
referred to as a measurement. 
Thus a quantum entity exists in general in a superposition state, and a measurement causes it to 
collapse nondeterministically to an eigenstate of that measurement. The specifics of the measurement 
constitute the context that elicit one of the states that were previously potential. Its evolution cannot be 
examined without performing measurements—that is, introducing contexts—but the contexts 
unavoidably affect its evolution. The evolution of a quantum particle is an extreme case of 
nondeterministic change, as well as of context sensitivity, because its state at any point in time reflects 
the context to which it is exposed.   
 
Evolution of Quantum Particles 
The other mode of change in standard quantum mechanics is the dynamical change of state when no 
measurement is executed, referred to as ‘evolution’. This evolution is described by the Schrödinger 
equation, and it is considered a fundamentally different kind of change from ‘collapse’ under the 
influence of a measurement. The Schrödinger evolution is described by the Hamiltonian H which is the 
self-adjoint operator corresponding to the measurement h(t
i
) of the energy of the quantum particle, and 
the Schrödinger equation 
 
 
p(t + t
i
) = e
! iHt
h p(t
i
)  (1.12) 
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where p(t + t
i
) is the vector representing the state p(t + t
i
) of the quantum particle at time t + t
i
and 
p(t
i
) is the vector representing the state p(t
i
)of the quantum particle at time t
i
, while  e
! iHt
h is the 
unitary operator describing the time translation of state p(t
i
) to state p(t + t
i
) , and  h is Planck’s 
constant. It is possible to interpret the change of the state of a quantum entity as described by the 
Schrödinger equation as an effect of context, namely a context that is the rest of the universe. All the 
fields and matter present in the rest of the universe contribute to the effect. The change is deterministic. 
Specifically, if the quantum entity at a certain time t
i
is in state p(t
i
) , and the only change that takes 
place is this dynamical change governed by the Schrödinger equation, then state p(t + t
i
) at any time 
t + t
i
 later than t
i
 is determined.  
For historical reasons, physicists think of a measurement not as a context, but as a process that 
gives rise to outcomes that are read off a measurement apparatus. In this scheme of thought, the 
simplest measurements are assumed to be those with two possible outcomes. A measurement with one 
outcome is rightly not thought of as a measurement, because if the same outcome always occurs, 
nothing has been compared and/or measured. However, when measurements are construed as contexts, 
we see that the measurement with two possible outcomes is not the simplest change possible. It is the 
deterministic evolution process—which can be conceived as a measurement with one outcome—that is 
the simplest kind of change. This means that in quantum mechanics the effect of context on change is 
as follows: 
• When the context is the rest of the universe, its influence on the state of a quantum entity is 
deterministic, as described by the Schrödinger equation. 
• When the context is a measurement, its influence on a genuine superposition state is 
nondeterministic, described as a process of collapse. 
• When the context is a measurement, its influence on an eigenstate is deterministic, the eigenstate 
is not changed by the measurement. 
Thus, under the CAP framework, the two basic processes of change in quantum mechanics are united; 
what has been referred to as dynamical evolution is not fundamentally different from collapse. They are 
both processes of actualization of potentiality under the influence of a context. In dynamical evolution 
there is only one possible outcome, thus it is deterministic. In collapse, until the state of the entity 
becomes an eigenstate, there is more than one possible outcome, thus it is nondeterministic. 
It was mentioned that the standard quantum formalism contains some fundamental structural 
restrictions. For example, the state space, i.e. the complex Hilbert space, is a linear space. It was also 
mentioned that more general axiomatic approaches to quantum mechanica have been developed where 
these structural restrictions are not present. More specifically, the state space in such a quantum 
axiomatic approach does not need to be a linear space. The SCOP approach which is the underlying 
mathematical framework for the ‘context driven actualization of potential’ change  envisaged here, is 
such an axiomatic quantum ‘and’ classical  approach, i.e. both standard quantum mechanics and 
classical mechanics are special cases of this SCOP formalism.33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41 There is an even more 
specific structural restriction of standard quantum mechanics, namely the fact that the Schrödinger 
equation is a linear equation, and can only represent changes of states described by a unitary 
transformation. For this reason, even staying within the standard quantum mechanical Hilbert space 
formalism for the state space, non-linear and hence non-unitary evolution more general than the 
Schrödinger one have been considered and studied on many occasions. 42,43,44,45 All these variations on 
standard quantum mechanics are special cases of the SCOP formalism, and hence CAP incorporates the 
types of changes modeled by them. 
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Evolution of Classical Physical Entities 
Classical physical entities are the paradigmatic example of lack of sensitivity to and internalization of 
context, and deterministic change of state. However, theorists are continually expanding their models to 
include more of the context surrounding an entity in order to better predict its behavior, which suggests 
that things are not so tidy in the world of classical physical objects as Newtonian physics suggests. 
Macro-level physical entities may exhibit structure similar to the entanglement of quantum 
mechanics.46 This is the case when change of state of the entity cannot be predicted due to lack of 
knowledge of how it interacts with its context.47,48 
 
5.2. Biological Evolution  
Some theorists seeking to develop an integrative framework for the physical and life sciences (e.g.49) 
focus on tools or phenomena that are applicable to or appear in both such as power laws and adaptive 
landscapes. The real challenge, however, is to develop an adaptive framework that encompasses what 
is unique about biological life, what makes some matter alive, and what give rise to lineages that 
undergo adaptive modification. This is closely tied with the origins of structure with the capacity to 
self-replicate, and the refinement of this capacity through the emergence of the genetic code.50,51 Thus, 
this section is divided into four parts. The first concerns autocatalytic sets of polymers, which 
replicated themselves (sloppily) without genetic information, and are therefore are widely believed to 
be the first forms that can be considered ‘alive’. The second concerns organisms after genetically coded 
replication was established but prior to sexual reproduction. The third concerns sexually reproducing 
organisms. The fourth part is a general comment on the structure of biochemical change. 
 
The Earliest Life Forms 
Early life forms were more sensitive to context and prone to internalize context than present-day life 
because their replication took place not according to instructions (such as a genetic code), but through 
happenstance interactions. In Kauffman’s model of the origin of life,52 polymers catalyze reactions that 
generate other polymers, increasing their joint complexity, until together as a whole they form 
something that can more or less replicate itself.53 The set is autocatalytically closed because although 
no polymer catalyzes its own replication, each catalyzes the replication of another member of the set. 
So long as each polymer is getting duplicated somewhere in the set, eventually multiple copies of all 
polymers exist. Thus it can self-replicate, and continue to do so indefinitely, or at least until it changes 
so drastically that its self-replicating structure breaks down. (Notice that ‘death’ of such life forms is 
not a particularly noticeable event; the only difference between a dead organism and an alive one is that 
the alive one continues to spawn new replicants.) Replication is far from perfect, so ‘offspring’ are 
unlikely to be identical to their ‘parent’. Different chance encounters of polymers, or differences in 
their relative concentrations, or the appearance of new polymers, could all result in different polymers 
catalyzing a given reaction, which in turn altered the set of reactions to be catalyzed. Context was 
readily internalized by incorporating elements of the environment, thus there was plenty of room for 
heritable variation. 
Recent work has been shown that the dynamical structure of biochemical reactions is quantum-
like, above and beyond their microscopic (and obvious) quantum structure.54,55,56 This stems from the 
fact that not only in the micro-domain where standard quantum structures are known to exist, but also 
in other domains where change-of-state depends on how an entity interacts with its context, the 
resulting probabilities can be non-Kolmogorovian, and the appropriate formalisms for describing them 
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are either the quantum formalisms or mathematical generalizations of them. Kolmogorovian probability 
models consider only actualized entities, and their actualized interactions, and assumes that all 
evolutionary change is steered by these actualized entities, and their actualized interactions.Within 
CAP, potential states of entities, and potential interactions between them, can be described.  
 
Genetic Code Impedes Retention of Context in Lineage 
A significant transition in the history of life was the transition from uncoded, self-organized replication 
to replication as per instructions given by a genetic code. This has been beautifully described and 
modelled by Vetsigian, Goldenfeld, and Woese57 They refer to the transition from sloppy self-
replication of autocatalytic form to precise replication using a genetic code as the Darwinian transition, 
since it is at this point that traits acquired at the level of individuals were no longer inherited and 
natural selection, a population-level mechanism of change, becomes applicable. We saw that prior to 
coded replication, a change to one polymer would still be present in offspring after budding occurred, 
and this could cause other changes that have a significant effect on the lineage further downstream. 
There was nothing to prohibit inheritance of acquired characteristics. But with the advent of explicit 
self-assembly instructions, acquired characteristics were no longer passed on to the next generation. 
The reason for this stems from the fact that, as first noted by von Neumann58, they are self-replicating 
automata, meaning that they contain a coded instruction set that is used in two distinct ways: (1) as a 
self-assembly code that is interpreted during development, and (2) as self-instructions that are passively 
copied during reproduction. It is this separation of how the code is used to generate offspring, and how 
the code is used during development, that is at the foundation of their lack of inheritance of acquired 
traits. 
 Since acquired characteristics were no longer being passed on to the next generation, the process 
became more constrained, robust, and shielded from external influence. (Thus for example, if one cuts 
off the tail of a mouse, its offspring will have tails of a normal length.) A context-driven change of state 
of an organism only affects its lineage if it impacts the generation and survival of progeny (such as by 
affecting the capacity to attract mates, or engage in parental care). Clearly, the transition from uncoded 
to coded replication, while ensuring fidelity of replication, decreased long-term sensitivity to and 
internalization of context, and thus capacity for context independence. Since one generation was almost 
certainly identical to the next, the evolution became more deterministic. As a result, in comparison with 
entities of other sorts, biological entities are resistant to internalization and retention of context-driven 
change. Though the term ‘adaptation’ is most closely associated with biology, biological form is 
resistant to adaptation.  This explains why it has been possible to develop a theory of biological 
evolution that all but ignores the problem of incomplete knowledge of context. As we saw earlier, it is 
possible to ignore this problem if all contexts are equally likely, or if context has a limited effect on 
heritability. In biology, since acquired traits are not heritable, the only contextual interactions that exert 
much of an effect are those that affect the generation of offspring. Thus it is because classical stochastic 
models work fine when lack of knowledge concerns the state of the entity and not the context that 
natural selection has for so long been viewed as adequate for the description of biological evolution. In 
Aerts, Czachor, and D’Hooghe59 and Aerts et al.60, Darwinian evolution is analyzed with respect to 
potentiality using a specific example, and various possible (and speculative) consequences of this 
difference are put forward. 
 
Sexual Reproduction 
With the advent of sexual reproduction, the contextuality of biological evolution increased. Consider an 
organism that is heterozygous for trait X with two alleles A and a. The potential of this Aa organism 
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gets actualized differently depending on the context provided by the genotype of the organism’s mate. 
In the context of an AA mate, the Aa organism’s potential is constrained to include only AA or Aa 
offspring. In the context of an aa mate, it has the potential for Aa or aa offspring, and once again some 
of this potential might get actualized. And so forth. But while the mate constrains the organism’s 
potential, the mate is necessary to actualize some of this potential in the form of offspring. In other 
words, the genome of the mate simultaneously makes some aspects of the Aa organism’s potentiality 
possible, and others impossible. An organism exists in a state of potentiality with respect to the 
different offspring (variants of itself) it could produce with a particular mate. In other words, a mate 
constitutes a context for which an organism is a state of potentiality. One can get away with ignoring 
this to the extent that one can assume mating is random. Note that since a species is delineated 
according to the capacity of individuals to mate with one another, speciation can be viewed as the 
situation wherein one variant no longer has the potential to create a context for the other for which its 
state is a potentiality state with respect to offspring. A species can be said to be adapted to the extent 
that its previous states could have collapsed to different outcomes in different contexts, and thus to the 
extent its form reflects the particular contexts to which it was exposed. Note also that although over 
time species becomes increasingly context dependent, collectively they are becoming more context 
independent. (For virtually any ecological niche there exists some branch of life that can cope with it.)  
Some (e.g.61) argue for expansion of the concept of selection to other hierarchical levels, e.g. 
group selection. We agree with Kitcher62 that ‘despite the vast amount of ink lavished upon the idea of 
“higher-order” processes’, once we have the causal story, it’s a matter of convention whether we say 
that selection is operating at the level of the species, the organism, the genotype, or the gene. It is not 
the concept of selection that needs expansion, but the embedding of selection in a framework for how 
change can occur. The actual is but the realized fragment of the potential, and selection works only on 
this fragment, what is already actual. We can now return to our question about what natural selection 
has to say about the fitness of the offspring you might have with one mate as opposed to another. The 
answer is of course, nothing, but why? Because the situation involves actualization of potential and 
nondeterminism with respect to context, and as we have seen, a nonclassical formalism is necessary to 
describe the change of state involved. The CAP perspective also clarifies why fitness has been so hard 
to nail down. We agree with Krimbas63 that fitness is a property of neither organism nor environment, 
but emerges at the interface between them, and changes from case to case. 
 
5.3. Change of State in Cognitive Processes 
Campbell64,65,66,67 argues that a stream of creative thought is a Darwinian process. The basic idea is that 
we generate new ideas through variation and selection: ‘mutate’ the current thought in a multitude of 
different ways, select the variant that looks best, mutate it in various ways and select the best, and so 
forth, until a satisfactory idea results. Thus a stream of thought is treated as a series of tiny selections. 
This view has been extended, most notably by Simonton.68,69,70,71 The problems with this thesis are 
outlined in detail elsewhere72,73, but one that is evident following our preceding discussion is that 
thoughts simply are not von Neumann self-replicating automata. Another is that selection theory 
requires multiple, distinct, simultaneously-actualized states. But in cognition, each thought or cognitive 
state changes the ‘selection pressure’ against which the next is evaluated; they are not simultaneously 
selected amongst. The mind can exist in a state of potentiality, and change through interaction with the 
context to a state that is genuinely new, not just an element of a pre-existing set of states. Creative 
thought is a matter of honing in on an idea by redescribing successive iterations of it from different real 
or imagined perspectives74; i.e. actualizing potential through exposure to different contexts. Once 
again, the description of contextual change of state introduces a non-Kolmogorovian probability 
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distribution, and a classical formalism such as selection theory cannot be used. Thus an idea certainly 
changes as it gets mulled over in a stream of thought, and indeed it appears to evolve, but the process is 
not Darwinian. Campbell’s error is to treat a set of potential, contextually elicited states of one entity as 
if they were actual states of a collection of entities, or possible states with no effect of context, even 
though the mathematical structure of the two situations is completely different. In a stream of thought, 
neither are all contexts equally likely, nor does context have a limited effect on future iterations. So the 
assumptions that make classical stochastic models useful approximations do not hold. 
 
5.4. Cultural Evolution 
Culture, even more often than creative thought, is interpretted in evolutionary terms. Some scientists 
view culture merely as a contributing to the biological evolution of our species. Increasingly, however, 
culture is viewd as an evolutionary process in and of its own (though one that still is intertwined with, 
and influences, biological evolution). In this section we look at how cultural evolution (as a second 
evolutionary process) fits into the CAP framework.  
 
Culture Evolves Without a Self-Assembly Code 
The basic unit of culture has been assumed to be the behavior or artifact, or the mental representations 
or ideas that give rise to concrete cultural forms. The meme notion further implies that these cultural 
units are replicators,75 misleadingly, because it does not consist of self-assembly instructions.76 (An 
idea may retain structure as it passes from one individual to another, but does not replicate it.) Looking 
at cultural evolution from the CAP framework we ask: what is really changing through cultural 
processes? Because of the distributed nature of human memory, it is never is just one discrete 
‘meme’affected by a cultural experience; it is ones view of how the world hangs together, ones’ model 
of reality, or worldview. A worldview is not merely a collection of discrete ideas or memes (nor do 
ideas or memes form an interlocking set like puzzle pieces) because each context impacts it differently; 
concepts and ideas are always colored by the situation in which they are evoked.77,78,79 Indeed it has 
been argued that a worldview is a replicator.80 We saw that living organisms prior to the genetic code—
a pre-RNA set of autocatalytic polymers—were  primitive replicators because they generate self-
similar structure, but in a self-organized, emergent, piecemeal manner, eventually, for each polymer, 
there existed another that catalyzed its formation. Since there was no self-assembly instructions to copy 
from, there was no explicit copying going on. The presence of a given catalytic polymer, say X, simply 
speeded up the rate at which certain reactions took place, while another polymer, say Y, influenced the 
reaction that generated X.  Just as polymers catalyze reactions that generate other polymers, retrieval of 
an item from memory can trigger another, which triggers yet another and so forth, thereby cross-linking 
memories, ideas, and so forth into a conceptual web. Like the autocatalytic sets of poymers considered 
earlier,81 the result can be described as a connected closure structure.82,83 Elements of a worldview are 
regenerated through social learning. Since as with Kauffman’s origin of life scenario the process 
occurrs in a self-organized, piecemeal autocatalytic manner, through bottom-up interactions rather than 
a top-down code, worldviews like the earliest life forms replicate with low fidelity, and their evolution 
is highly nondeterministic.   
 
Inheritance of Acquired Traits in Culture  
As with the earliest pre-DNA forms of life, characteristics of a worldview acquired over a lifetime are 
heritable. We hear a joke and, in sharing it with others, give it our own slant. We create a disco version 
of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony and a rap version of that. The evolutionary trajectory of a worldview 
makes itself known indirectly via the behavior and artifacts it manifests under the influence of the 
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contexts it encounters. (For example, when you explain to a child how to brush ones’ teeth, certain 
facets of your worldview are revealed, while your writing of a poem reveals other facets.)  
 Because acquired traits are heritable in culture, the probability of splitting into multiple variants 
is high. These variants can range from virtually identical to virtually impossible to trace back to the 
same ‘parent’ idea. They affect, and are affected by, the minds that encounter them. For example, 
books can affect all the individuals who read them, and these individuals subsequently provide new 
contexts for the possible further evolution of the ideas they described and stories they told. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper introduced a general framework for characterizing how entities evolve through context-
driven actualization of potential (CAP). By this we mean an entity has the potential to change in 
different ways under different contexts. Some aspects of this potentiality are actualized when the entity 
undergoes a change of state through interaction with the particular context it encounters. The 
interaction between entity and context may also change the context, and the constraints and affordances 
it offers the entity. Thus the entity undergoes another change of state, and so forth, recursively.  
When evolution is construed as the incremental change that results from recursive, context-driven 
actualization of potential, the domains through which we have carved up reality can be united under 
one umbrella. Quantum, classical, biological, cognitive, and cultural evolution appear as different ways 
in which potential that is present due to the state of an entity, its context, and the nature of their 
interaction. They differ according to the degree of sensitivity to context, internalization of context, 
dependence upon a particular context. nondeterminism due to lack of knowledge concerning the state 
of the entity, and nondeterminism due to lack of knowledge concerning the state of the context. 
The reason potentiality and contextuality are so important stems from the fact that we inevitably 
have incomplete knowledge of the universe in which an entity is operating. When the state of the entity 
of interest and/or context are in constant flux, or undergoing change at a resolution below that which 
we can detect but nevertheless affect what emerges at the entity-context interface, this gives rise in a 
natural way to nondeterministic change. Nondeterminism that arises through lack of knowledge 
concerning the state of the entity can be described by classical stochastic models (Markov processes) 
because the probability structure is Kolmogorovian. However, nondeterminism that arises through lack 
of knowledge concerning the interaction between entity and context introduces a non-Kolmogorovian 
probability model84 on the state space, necessitating a nonclassical formalism. Historically, the first 
nonclassical formalism was the quantum formalism. This formalism has since been generalized to 
describe situations involving nonlinearity, and varying degrees of contextuality.  
Let us sum up a few of the more interesting results to come out of this framework. It has been 
thought that the two modes of change in quantum mechanics—dynamical evolution of the quantum 
entity as per the Schrödinger equation, and the collapse that takes place when the quantum entity is 
measured—were fundamentally different. However, when the measurement is seen to be a context, we 
notice that it is always a context that could actualize the potential of the entity in different ways. 
Indeed, if one knows the outcome with certainty one does not perform a measurement; it is only when 
there is more than one possible value that a measurement is performed. Thus the two modes of change 
in quantum mechanics are united; the dynamical evolution of a quantum entity as per the Schrödinger 
equation reduces to a collapse for which there was only one way to collapse (i.e. only one possible 
outcome), hence deterministic collapse. This also holds for the deterministic evolution of classical 
entities. This constitutes a true paradigm shift, for evolution and collapse have been thought to be two 
fundamentally different processes.  
Looking at biological evolution from the CAP perspective, self-replication appears as a means of 
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testing the integrity of an entity—or rather different versions of an entity—against different contexts. 
While individuals and even species become increasingly context-dependent, the joint entity of living 
organisms becomes increasingly context-independent.The genetic code afforded primitive life 
protection against contextually-induced disintegration of self-replication capacity, at the cost of 
decreased diversity. The onset of sexual reproduction increased potentiality, and thus possible 
trajectories for biological form. The CAP framework supports the notion that fitness is a property of 
neither organism nor environment, but emerges at the interface between them. The concept of potential 
fitness includes all possible evolutionary trajectories under all possible contexts. Since it involves 
nondeterminism with respect to context, unless context has a limited effect or all possible contexts are 
equally likely, a nonclassical formalism is necessary to describe the novel form that results when an 
organism interacts with its environment in a way that makes some of its potential became actual (where 
actual fitness refers only to the realized segment of its potentiality). It now becomes clear why natural 
selection has been able to tell us much about changes in frequencies of existing forms, but little about 
how new forms emerge in the first place! The CAP framework provides a perspective from which we 
can see why the neo-Darwinian view of evolution has been satisfactory for so long, and it wasn’t until 
after other processes become prominently viewed in evolutionary terms that the time was ripe for 
potentiality and contextuality to be taken seriously. We also see how unique the genetic code is, and the 
consequent lack of retention of context-driven change. The effects of contextual interaction in biology 
are in the long-run largely  invisible; context affects lineages only by influencing the number and 
nature of offspring. Natural selection is such an exceptional means of change, it is no wonder it does 
not transfer readily to other domains. Note that it is often said that because acquired traits are inherited 
in culture, culture should not be viewed in evolutionary terms. It is ironic that this critique also applies 
to the earliest stage of biological evolution itself. What was true of early life is also true of the 
replication of worldviews: acquired characteristics can be inherited. Modern life is unique in this sense. 
The same argument holds for what happens in a stream of creative thought. The mathematical 
formulation of the theory of natural selection requires that in any given iteration there be multiple 
distinct, actualized states. In cognition however, each successive mental state changes the context in 
which the next is evaluated; they are not simultaneously selected amongst. Creative thought is a matter 
of honing in on an idea by redescribing successive iterations of it from different real or imagined 
perspectives; actualizing potential through exposure to different contexts. Thus selection theory is not 
applicable to the formal description of a stream of thought, and to the extent that creative thought 
powers cultural change, it is of limited applicability there as well. Once again, a nonclassical formalism 
is necessary. 
 The notion of culture as a Darwinian process probably derives from the fact that the means 
through which a creative mind manifests itself in the world—language, art, and so forth—exist as 
discrete entities such as stories and paintings. This can lead to the assumption that discrete creative 
artifacts in the world spring forth from corresponding discrete, pre-formed entities in the brain. This in 
turn leads to the assumption that novelty gets generated through that most celebrated of all change-
generating mechanisms, Darwinian selection, and that ideas and artifacts must therefore be replicators. 
However, an idea or artifact is not a replicator because it does not consist of coded self-assembly 
instructions, and thus does not make copies of itself. Moreover, ideas and artifacts do not arise out of 
separate, distinct compartments in the brain, but emerge from a dynamically and contextually 
modifiable, web-like memory structure, a melting pot in which different components continually merge 
and blend, get experienced in new ways as they arise in new contexts and combinations. The CAP 
perspective suggests instead that the basic unit and the replicator of culture is an integrated network of 
knowledge, attitudes, ideas, and so forth; that is, an internal model of the world, or worldview, and that 
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ideas and artifacts are how a worldview reveals itself under a particular context.  
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